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1 - Introduction 
 
‘We are a Convention. We are not an Intergovernmental Conference because we have not been 
given a mandate by Governments to negotiate on their behalf the solutions which we propose. 
We are not a Parliament because we are not an institution elected by citizens to draft legislative 
texts. That role belongs to the European Parliament and to national Parliaments. We are a 
Convention. What does that mean?’   
Valery Giscard d’Estaing at the inaugural meeting of the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
Brussels, 28 February, 2002. 
 
 
Treaty reform has traditionally been conducted by governmental representatives behind closed doors in 
intergovernmental conferences (IGC’s). In a significant break with this method, the EU Charter was 
negotiated in a parliamentary-like, open ‘convention’ in parallel with the 2000 IGC. Due to the 
perceived failure of the 2000 IGC to solve the problems raised by the upcoming enlargement of the 
EU, and the relative success of the EU Charter Convention, it was decided to create a second 
convention to prepare the next IGC.
1 This European Convention
2 is currently debating a draft 
Constitutional Treaty that will replace the existing treaties, and perhaps relegate an upcoming IGC to 
being a mere rubber-stamping exercise.  
  Does this change in the method of negotiating treaty reform matter? This paper investigates the 
impact of the change in the negotiating context and manner they are conducted for the ability of the 
Commission, Council Secretariat, and European Parliament to gain influence upon the process and 
outcomes of treaty reform negotiations. Is the convention method really a new form of constitutional 
bargaining in the EU, or is it business as usual, where national representatives dictate the broad bounds 
of the treaty, and where the Presidency, Council Secretariat, and sometimes the Commission can 
exploit their institutional positions to shift outcomes within these bounds?
3  
The argument in this paper proceeds in five steps. First, as most theories of integration ignore the 
impact of actual negotiation processes,
4 this paper first puts forward in section 2 a bargaining model 
that theorizes on how treaty reform negotiations can affect how actor bargaining resources and 
preferences are translated into influence over outcomes. Section 3 briefly reviews how treaty reform 
                                                 
1 - Hoffmann, 2002. 
2 - The full name of the second convention is the Convention on the Future of Europe. 
3 - See Beach, 2002b, 2003. 
4 - See the discussion in Beach, 2002b.   2
negotiations have traditionally been conducted since 1985, and the major innovations introduced with 
the convention method. The section then develops three ‘ideal types’ of the method of treaty reform 
negotiations. Thereafter section 4 debates the differences in the possibilities for EU institutions to gain 
influence over outcomes created by the changes in negotiating context. Following this is a brief section 
on whether the EU institutions were successfully able to translate these possibilities into real influence 
in the treaty reform negotiations. 
The empirical findings show that the change in negotiating context has mattered. This change has 
different effects for the different EU institutions – significantly strengthening the European Parliament 
(EP) and Commission, but weakening the Council Secretariat. While the Commission’s possibilities for 
gaining influence have been in the decline since mid-1991, the Commission has gained a much stronger 
role in the convention method. Yet there are few indications that the Commission’s actual level of 
influence over outcomes has significantly increased, and for example in the present Convention there 
are signs that the ability of the Commission to gain influence has been significantly impaired by its 
inconsistent positions and internal disagreements.  
The Council Secretariat’s role and impact has been in the ascendancy since the 1990-91 IGC’s. 
The Council Secretariat was also central in the first convention due to its central role in the drafting 
process. But in the present Convention the Council Secretariat has been the major loser among the EU 
institutions, with the drafting role being given to a conglomerate Convention Secretariat composed of 
officials seconded from the secretariats of the Council, Commission and EP, together with several 
national officials.  
In contrast, the EP has been the main winner in the shift from the IGC to the convention 
method. The EP has had little if any role in past IGC negotiations, whereas the EP has gained an 
accepted role in the convention method, and has had a large contingent in the conventions.  
The conclusion discusses these findings and their implications for the way in which we study 
treaty reform negotiations in the EU, pointing the direction towards more explicit theoretical models 
that detail how different negotiating contexts are different, and what impacts these differences have 
upon outcomes. 
 
 
   3
Section 2 – A bargaining model for how negotiation processes matter in EU 
treaty reform 
 
How does the negotiation process affect the ability of EU institutions to gain influence over outcomes 
in treaty reform negotiations? In this section I will introduce a bargaining model based upon the 
assumptions of actors being boundedly rationality, and that negotiations have relatively high transaction 
costs. The model shows how negotiations matter for the ability of actors to translate their bargaining 
resources into influence over outcomes. Influence is here defined pragmatically as the successful use of 
bargaining resources to change an outcome to something that it otherwise would not have been in the 
absence of the action.  
The following first discusses the theoretical significance of the bargaining resources possessed by 
EU institutions (see figure 1). Thereafter two categories of intervening variables than can affect how 
these bargaining resources are translated into influence will be put forward. In the first category are 
three contextual variables relating to the nature of the particular EU treaty reform negotiation. These 
contextual variables define the range of intervening strategies available to EU institutional actors during 
the negotiation process. The second category of intervening variables looks at how the EU institutions 
play their cards in the negotiations, focusing on the ability of EU institutional actors to either shape the 
agenda, or to play a brokering and mediating role in the negotiations. 
Independent 
variables 
Intervening 
variables 
Dependent 
variable 
Bargaining 
resources 
Process 
variables 
Context 
variables 
● material resources 
(i.e. voting power) 
● comparative 
informational 
advantages 
Nature of the 
negotiations 
● institutional 
set-up 
Actor strategy 
during the 
negotiations 
● agenda-shaping 
strategies 
● brokerage 
strategies 
● nature of issues
● level of 
complexity of 
negotiations 
Level of 
influence of 
EU institution 
Feedback loop 
● perceived 
acceptability of 
interventions 
Figure 1 – A bargaining model of the importance of the negotiation process to the ability of EU 
institutional actors to gain influence in treaty reform negotiations   4
  But first, why should negotiations on treaty reform matter? Most of the literature on European 
integration has all but ignored the analytical importance of the processes whereby treaty amendments 
are negotiated.
5 Existing research has primarily focused on explaining outcomes based upon the input 
of demands for integration – in effect ‘black boxing’ the importance of the actual negotiation process.
6 
For example, Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach claims to be able to explain IGC 
outcomes based upon patterns of actor dependence upon agreement (input).
7 Based upon the Nash 
bargaining solution drawn from co-operative game theory, Moravcsik argues that actors in treaty 
reform negotiations split utility gains symmetrically between themselves based upon their relative levels 
of dependence upon an agreement.
8  
For the Nash bargaining solution to be an accurate explanation of a given bargaining outcome, 
the following assumptions must hold: first, negotiations must have low transaction costs, with actors 
having comprehensive rationality coupled with close to perfect information; and secondly that factors 
intrinsic to the negotiation process itself must not privilege any actor. While these restrictive 
assumptions are rarely fulfilled in an actual bargaining situation, as Nash himself candidly has pointed 
out,
9 Moravcsik has attempted to empirically demonstrate that as the gains of co-operation for 
governments are high relative to transaction costs, this gives governments incentives to provide all of the 
entrepreneurial functions necessary to reach an agreement, and therefore we can proceed as if the 
transactions costs were close to zero
10  – in effect ‘black boxing’ the significance of the negotiation 
process itself.  
Yet the reality of treaty reform negotiations seldom lives up to these strict assumptions. Treaty 
reform negotiations are often, despite extensive preparation at both the national and EU-level, poorly 
defined negotiating situations, with national representatives possessing incomplete knowledge of their 
own preferences and those of other actors’, and details of the multitude of complex issues on the 
agenda.
11 This is very evident in the present discussions in the EU Convention, where 1,087 proposed 
                                                 
5 - For a more in-depth review of the literature, see Beach, 2002b. 
6 - There are a few notable exceptions, including Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, and more empirical oriented works such as 
Stubb, 2002 and Svensson, 2000. Yet most of the work on treaty reform, be it neofunctionalist or intergovernmentalist, 
has explained outcomes based upon converging patterns of national interest. 
7 - Moravcsik, 1993, 1995, 1998. 
8 - Moravcsik , 1998:61-64. 
9 - Nash, 1950:155; 1953:130. 
10 - Moravcsik, 1998, 1999a, 1999b. 
11 - See Stubb, 2002 for more on IGC negotiations. See Pollack, 1997 for more on daily EU policy-making. For more on 
complex negotiations more generally, see Midgaard and Underdal, 1977; Hampson with Hart, 1995; and Simon, 1997.   5
amendments to the first 16 draft articles have been received by the Presidium – creating a situation 
where few if any members of the Convention have a fully synoptic view of the state-of-play.
12 
And even if we could proceed as if actors were comprehensively rational, possessed close to 
perfect information, and that the negotiation process itself has low bargaining costs, there are factors 
intrinsic to the negotiation process, such as the possession of a privileged institutional positions, that 
potentially can privilege one actor vis-à-vis others. For instance, actors sitting in the Presidium of the 
EU Convention have privileged opportunities to shape the agenda in comparison to normal members 
of the Convention (see below for more). Further, how actors play their cards matters. For example 
there is evidence in the negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam in the 1996-97 IGC that France did 
poorly in the negotiations due to the incoherence and ill-prepared nature of its positions.
13 
  It is therefore necessary for analysts of EU treaty reform to open up the negotiation ‘black box’ 
to investigate how the structure and conduct of the process matters. How then can negotiations on 
treaty reform matter?  
 
2.1. The independent variables – bargaining resources 
 
Material bargaining resources 
As shown by rational choice institutionalism, the potential impact of voting power of actors depends 
upon the decision-making rules employed in a negotiation. The voting power of a given actor is 
naturally greater in unanimity than in majority voting, other things equal.
14 Further, despite all actors in 
both the convention and IGC methods being formally equal in the weight of their vote, it is also evident 
in practice that the real weight or impact of actor votes is linked to their perceived economic and 
political strength. For example, disapproval by either the German or French government has a greater 
potential impact than a similar disapproval by a small Member State such as Portugal or Denmark. A 
Commission weakened by political scandals and a weak president has less de facto weight than a 
European Parliament that enjoys democratic legitimacy.  
  
                                                 
12 - See CONV 574/03, ‘Reactions to draft Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty – Summary Sheets.’. Brussels, 21 
February, 2003. Also Financial Times, 28.02.03, p. 5. 
13 - Beach, 2002a:623. 
14 - See Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996 for arguments that support this in the EU context.    6
Comparative informational advantages 
Complex, multilateral bargaining situations such as EU treaty reform negotiations are, despite extensive 
preparation at both the national and EU-level, often poorly defined negotiating situations, with actors 
possessing imperfect knowledge of the many complex issues on the agenda, and about their own and 
the preferences of other actors.
15 One well-informed EU insider has characterized traditional IGC 
negotiations by stating that, ‘Governments and their negotiators do not always know what they want 
and the situation changes unpredictably with the dynamics of the negotiations where written and oral 
proposals are floated around the table by all the participants at frequent intervals.’
16 This is also evident 
in the present European Convention, where hundreds of detailed proposals have been tabled by 
members of the Convention on the numerous substantively and legally complex issues on the agenda, 
and 1,087 amendment proposals have been submitted to the first 16 draft articles, and numerous others 
have been tabled for the rest of the articles in the treaty.  
  As actors in treaty reform negotiations realistically only are ‘boundedly rational’,
17 there are 
natural cognitive limitations upon the negotiating abilities of actors. In such circumstances, the 
possession of comparative informational advantages, be they substantive expertise or bargaining skills, 
can potentially be translated into influence over outcomes. 
First, not all actors are equal regarding their levels of substantive knowledge of the issues under 
discussion (content expertise), their analytical skills (process expertise), and their knowledge of the 
state-of-play of the negotiations.
18 Regarding content expertise, technical and legal knowledge are most 
relevant in treaty reform. Technical expertise relates to detailed and qualified knowledge of how a 
certain treaty provision works at present, and/or the anticipated consequences of the changes under 
consideration. Legal expertise is the possession of extensive knowledge of the body of EU law that can 
be used to estimate the potential impact and legality of changes in the EU Treaties.  
Looking at process expertise, not all national delegations in treaty reform negotiations possess the 
analytical skills to be able to digest the hundreds of often very complicated and technical proposals on 
the many different issues under discussion, preventing them from entering into an efficient joint 
problem-solving effort aimed at finding a mutually-acceptable outcome. In the present European 
Convention, many delegates have difficulties dealing with the many proposals and amendments that 
have been distributed in different languages, including Greek and Finnish.  
                                                 
15 - See Stubb, 2002 on IGC negotiations. See Pollack, 1997 for more on daily EU policy-making negotiations. For more on 
international multilateral negotiations more generally, see Midgaard and Underdahl, 1977; Hampson with Hart, 1995; 
Hopmann, 1996. 
16 - Stubb, 2002:27. 
17 - Simon, 1997:94; Jones, 2001. 
18 - Wall and Lynn, 1993; Sandholtz, 1992:27-28; Cox and Jacobson, 1973:20; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:899-900.    7
Finally, turning to the importance of information on actor preferences and the state-of-play of 
negotiations, there are two reasons why delegates in treaty reform negotiations often do not have 
detailed information on the nature and intensity of the preferences of other actors on the myriad of 
issues under discussion. It is difficult for a single delegate without significant back-up services to keep 
track of different actor preferences on the large number of very detailed issues under discussion – 
something that is especially evident for national parliamentarians and MEP’s in the convention method. 
Second, governmental representatives, despite publishing opinions prior to a negotiation and presenting 
arguments and proposals during the negotiations, are often reluctant to reveal their ‘true’ preferences.
19 
National representatives can for instance have strategic reasons for holding their cards, waiting to see 
how an issue plays out before revealing their hand.
20 In such a situation a trusted intervening actor can 
discuss with each party the nature and intensity of their preference in an attempt to find a mutually 
acceptable, Pareto-efficient outcome.
21 But by gaining private information about the zone of possible 
agreement, the intervening actor can also craft an agreement within this zone that is closest to its own 
preferred outcome.
22 
 
The perceived acceptability of the actor 
Turning to the third category of independent variable, a further type of resource that EU institutional 
actors can possess is the level of acceptability of their contributions among other actors in the treaty 
reform negotiations. Levels of acceptance can be based recognition of a broad majority of actors of the 
utility of the actor’s contributions, and the legitimacy and/or reputation of the actor.
23  
The reputation of the EU institutional actor can though be threatened if the actor is perceived by 
a majority of important actors to be excessively partial either in the way in which they fulfill a specific 
institutional role (procedural bias), or as regards excessively promoting a particularly unwelcome 
outcome (outcome bias).
24 If an actor is widely perceived to be excessively pursuing its own interests, 
this may undermine their ability to gain influence over outcomes, for example if Commission 
                                                 
19 - Metcalfe, 1998:425; Stenelo, 1972:54. Moravcsik, 1999a:279 makes the point that actors that have incentives to withhold 
information from one another would also have incentives to withhold it from a EU institutional actor. However, in the 
IGC method for example, the Council Secretariat sits at the center of a web of communications in an IGC, and given its 
reputation as a trusted insider, national governments often are more open with the Secretariat than they are with other 
national delegations.   
20 - Underdal, 2002: 115. 
21 - Scharpf, 1997:145; Raiffa, 1982; Metcalfe, 1998:424-425; Stenelo, 1972:54. 
22 - Lax and Sebenius, 1986. 
23 - Wehr and Lederach, 1996; Bercovitch and Houston, 1996:25-27; Hampson, 1995:18; Tallberg, forthcoming; Hopmann, 
1996:225; Kleibor, 1998. 
24 - Bercovitch, 1996b:5. The distinction between perceived acceptability and excessive partiality is an invisible red-line, but 
the effects of crossing this are often very evident.   8
representatives are widely seen to be championing a strongly pro-integrative vision in EU defense 
policy that is far outside of what a majority of members of the Convention are interested in, their 
contributions are likely to fall upon deaf ears. The level of acceptance is modeled in my bargaining 
model as a feedback loop from actor strategies during the negotiations back into the perceived 
acceptability of EU institutional intervention (see figure 1, above). 
  
2.2. The intervening variables  
 
Contextual variables  
Looking first at the theorized impact of the structure of the EU treaty reform negotiations, a widely 
held conjecture in negotiation theory and rational choice institutionalism holds that how negotiations 
are structured affects how actor bargaining resources are translated into influence over outcomes.
25 
This is particularly evident when we are dealing with highly institutionalized, multilateral negotiations 
such as treaty reform negotiations.    
First, the institutional set-up of the negotiation can matter in that actors either can start with or 
gain a privileged position during a negotiation that can be exploited to influence outcomes. Examples 
of privileged institutional positions in the convention method include being in charge of the formal 
drafting process of treaty texts (Convention Secretariat together with the Presidium), or by having 
control of the agenda for each individual negotiating session (Presidium). These different institutional 
roles affect the opportunities and constraints upon actor strategies for gaining influence. Based upon 
general conjectures in the negotiation literature, we should expect that the ability of EU institutional 
actors to translate their bargaining resources into influence increases with the level of their involvement 
in the negotiation and drafting process. 
The nature of the issues under negotiation can also have an impact upon the ability of EU 
institutional actors to translate bargaining resources into influence. There are two dimensions to the 
nature of an issue: political saliency and complexity/technicality. First, while we can expect that very 
salient issues will be kept firmly under the control of national delegations, in less salient issues we 
would expect that EU institutional actors would have more discretion to shape the discussions and 
outcome. Second, if we realistically assume that delegates to the Convention do not have perfect 
knowledge of the often very complex institutional and legal implications of the many issues under 
discussion due to high information costs and bounded rationality, then we would expect that in 
                                                 
25 - Most prominently, Zartman, 2002. For the rational choice institutionalist position in the EU context, see the works of 
Garrett, Tsebelis, Pollack, and Tallberg.   9
complex and/or technical issues that EU institutional actors such as the Commission could more 
successfully exploit their comparative informational advantages. Therefore we should expect that the 
ability of EU institutional actors to translate their bargaining resources into influence varies inversely 
with the level of political salience of the issue, and that levels of influence would increase the higher the 
technicality and complexity of the issue-area. 
Finally, the number of issues and parties to the negotiations also matters, in that both can 
increase the level of complexity of a negotiation if they increase the number of cleavages in a given 
negotiation situation.
26 In highly complex, multilateral negotiations, with many cross-cutting cleavages, 
it is difficult for the parties to identify possible agreements, while meaningful communication between 
parties also becomes increasingly difficult.
27 In these types of complex situations the possession of 
analytical skills and the knowledge of actor preferences is a strategic asset that enables actors to both 
help the parties find a mutually agreeable outcome and, in the process, also grants them opportunities 
to influence the final outcome. Therefore we should expect that the ability of EU institutional actors to 
translate informational bargaining resources into influence increases with the number of issues and 
parties to a given negotiation. 
 
Process variables – actor strategy during the negotiations 
While the contextual variables described above define the range of intervening strategies available, EU 
institutional actors must successfully use negotiating strategies to translate their bargaining resources 
and the opportunities raised by the negotiating context in order to gain actual influence over outcomes. 
In the following two types of strategy are discussed: agenda-shaping and brokerage.  
  First, EU institutional actors can attempt to set and shape the agenda of the conference through 
the use of a variety of tactics to manipulate the existing agenda, put new issues onto the agenda, and 
exclude unwanted issues. Agenda manipulation involves actions to emphasize, de-emphasize, remove, 
or exclude issues from the negotiating agenda. Formal control of the agenda in the convention method 
rests with the Presidium, which includes members of the Commission, and EP. This gives EU 
institutional actors the possibility of manipulating the agenda, by for example emphasizing or removing 
certain issues in drafts and meeting agendas for the plenary assembly.  
Second, EU institutional actors can attempt to play a brokering or mediating role, utilizing their 
informational bargaining resources to help the parties find a mutually acceptable outcome, which also 
                                                 
26 - Midgaard and Underdal, 1977; Hampson, 1995:28-29. 
27 - Hampson, 1995:28-29; Raiffa, 1982; Midgaard and Underdal, 1977; Hopmann, 1996.   10
gives them opportunities to influence outcomes in the process.
28 While there are many different 
typologies of brokering and mediating strategies, for the present purposes it is most useful to focus on 
the more active types that attempt to affect the actual content and substance of the negotiations. In the 
treaty reform context, the most relevant mediating strategies deal with putting forward compromise 
proposals, and brokering support for certain positions. Crucial in this respect is the possession of 
extensive and reliable information on the nature and intensities of national preferences, and having a 
reputation as an honest broker. 
 
                                                 
28 - Carnevale and Arad, 1996; Young, 1991; Kressel, 1989.   11
Section 3 – An overview of the three ‘ideal types’ of treaty reform negotiations 
 
Briefly, there have been three major ‘ideal types’ for how treaty reform negotiations have been 
conducted since 1985. In reality, most negotiations have not been pure ‘ideal types’, but have 
encompassed elements of several methods. But it is possible to classify the treaty reform negotiations 
held since 1985 into three broad categories according to how the negotiations are prepared and 
conducted (see figure 2). 
 
 
The first category is what I term the community IGC method. Here the term ‘community’ does not 
refer to how decisions are taken within the supranational first pillar, but simply to the resemblance that 
the treaty reform negotiations have to the roles played by actors in normal community policy-making. 
The Commission has in this method a strong initiating and brokerage role, especially in the preparatory 
phase, with the actual IGC often only negotiating small changes in the original agenda from the 
‘Community’ 
IGC method 
Preparation of treaty 
reform negotiations 
‘Intergovern-
mental’  IGC 
method 
‘Convention’ 
method 
•composed of a group of  
expert actors 
•strong role for the Commission 
•strong role for the Commission 
•only small changes from agenda 
prepared by expert group 
•composed of national 
representatives 
•strong role for the Presidency 
and Council Secretariat 
•strong role for the Presidency 
and Council Secretariat 
•often extensive negotiation of 
and changes in a weak original 
agenda 
•composed of representatives 
of the Commission, EP, 
national governments, and 
national parliaments 
•strong role for the Presidium 
and Convention Secretariat 
Treaty reform 
negotiations 
•IGC as a ‘rubber stamp’ of 
the document produced by 
convention 
Figure 2 – Different methods of negotiating treaty reform in the EU.  12
preparatory phase. The best example of this type of treaty reform was the 1990-91 IGC that negotiated 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Here the Commission played a central role in setting the 
agenda within the so-called ‘Delors Committee’, chaired by Commission President Delors, and 
composed of national central bank governors and three independent experts. The final report of the 
Delors Committee set the agenda of the IGC, and was adopted with only a few amendments by the 
IGC.
29 
  The second category is here termed the intergovernmental IGC method. In comparison to the 
community IGC method, the IGC in the intergovernmental method is prepared by a group of national 
representatives, assisted and guided by the Presidency and Council Secretariat. The binding mandates 
given to the representatives prevent any real discussions in the preparatory stage, and therefore the 
agenda is often only a mere canvassing of different options that can be discussed in the IGC. Therefore 
the actual IGC negotiation process is more important in this method, with hard bargaining taking place 
between national representatives, assisted by the Presidency and Council Secretariat. Perhaps the best 
example of the intergovernmental method was the negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam in the 1996-
97 IGC. The IGC was prepared by a group of national representatives working under strict mandates, 
leading to a report to the IGC that merely depicted different options, and the levels of support and 
opposition for these options.
30 The actual IGC was dominated by national representatives and the 
Presidency-Council Secretariat team, and the final treaty was to a large extent a product of the dynamics 
of the actual IGC negotiations. 
  The third category is the novel convention method used in the negotiation of the EU Charter and the 
present European Convention. In this method of treaty reform, a more representative body is created 
by the European Council, composed of representatives of the heads of state and government, the 
Commission, and members of the EP and national parliaments. Within the convention, the Presidium 
and Convention Secretariat have the key roles of providing guidance and drafting for the large body of 
representatives. After the convention has produced a final document, this is then adopted by the 
Member States either acting within the European Council (the EU Charter), or in an IGC that acts 
essentially as a ‘rubber stamp’.
31 
 
                                                 
29 - See Beach, 2002b. 
30 - See Reflection Group, 1995. 
31 - Whether the present European Convention’s Constitutional Treaty will be adopted as is by the upcoming IGC is 
strongly debated, but most commentators agree that if the document receives the support of a sizable majority o factors 
in the convention, it will be difficult for the Member State governments to not adopt it as is (Hughes, 2003; Hoffmann, 
2002).   13
Section 4 - Comparing the possibilities for influence for EU institutions in the 
convention and the IGC methods 
 
In the following section I will discuss the changes in the possibilities for influence created by the 
change in negotiating methods. First, the section looks at whether the bargaining resources possessed 
by EU institutions differ in the different methods of negotiating treaty reform. Second, the section 
details the impact of the changes in: the institutional roles played by EU institutions; the nature of 
issues being negotiated; and the level of complexity of the negotiating situation. Section 5 will briefly 
discuss whether these possibilities have been exploited successfully in the different treaty reform 
negotiations. 
 
4.a. The bargaining resources of EU institutions under the convention and the 
IGC methods 
 
Material bargaining resources 
Article 48 EU mandates that a final treaty in an IGC must be agreed by ‘common accord’, granting 
each Member State a potential veto. While both the Commission and European Parliament are named 
in Article 48 EU, neither has any vote on the final outcome of an IGC, although several Member States 
including Italy and Belgium have in past IGC’s linked their assent to the final treaty with a favorable 
opinion from the EP.
32 The material resources of the Commission and the European Parliament are 
therefore significantly strengthened in the convention method, as they are official parties to the 
convention negotiations, and have a say over the final outcome both within the Presidium and the 
plenary assembly.  
  But voting procedures are also less clear in the convention method than in IGC’s. In the 
Convention on the EU Charter no rules for voting procedures were adopted, and the Tampere 
Conclusions referred to either a document with multiple options, or a document adopted by consensus. 
The final charter was adopted without a vote, and there were examples of points which were included 
in the final Charter that were opposed by members of the convention.
33 In the present European 
Convention it is stated in the rules of procedure that the final product of the Convention shall be 
                                                 
32 - Maurer, 2002:419-420; 2003:175-176. 
33 - Deloche-Gaudez, 2001. Proposals from two MEP’s to the convention for voting on ‘substantive’ issues by a two-thirds 
qualified majority were never discussed in the convention (Deloche-Gaudez, 2001:23; Agence Europe, 29.01.00, p. 4).   14
adopted using consensus
34 - but there have been no votes taken in the Convention, and at present it is 
still unclear as to how large a majority of members of the Convention will be needed for the final 
outcome to be termed ‘adopted by consensus’. But it is probable that for the final outcome to have an 
impact, and define the agenda for the upcoming IGC, the final Constitutional Treaty should be broadly 
perceived to have been approved by a majority of significant actors in the Convention, as was the case 
for the EU Charter.  
While the Commission only has two representatives in the Convention, if the Commission as a 
whole disapproves the final outcome of the present Convention, this would most likely significantly 
weaken the legitimacy of the final document. The EP has 16 representatives in the Convention that 
reflect the balance of political parties in the Parliament, but it is unlikely that all of the EP members will 
approve the final document, given that at least two of the MEP representatives are EU skeptics or 
opponents of European integration.
35 Yet as with the Commission, the backing of a majority of the 
MEP representatives is also likely to be essential for the success of the final document of the 
Convention. Further, the material bargaining resources of the EP are further strengthened by the ties 
that individual MEP’s have with national political parties and governments. 
Both institutions had one seat on the Presidium in the EU Charter Convention, and have two 
seats in the Presidium in the current Convention. The Presidium plays a role comparable to that of the 
Presidency in the IGC methods, controlling the agenda and drafting of texts. This gives both 
institutions significant material bargaining resources that potentially can be translated into influence 
over outcomes  
The Council Secretariat has no material bargaining resources in either the IGC or convention 
methods, as it is not an official party to the negotiations in either of the methods of treaty reform, but 
is merely an assistant to the negotiations. 
    
Comparative informational advantages 
The informational advantages of the Commission are similar in both negotiating contexts; although the 
Commission’s advantages are perhaps relatively stronger in the convention method vis-à-vis actors such 
as MEP’s and especially national parliamentarians. The Commission possesses significant informational 
advantages vis-à-vis most other actors in both IGC and convention methods in most issue areas. Given 
the central role the Commission plays in the legislative and executive processes in the EU, this provides 
the Commission with detailed insights into the substantive workings of the EU Treaties that are not 
                                                 
34 - Conv 9/02. 
35 - Muscardini (UEN) and Bonde (EDD).   15
possessed by any other actor. This is especially evident in policy areas that are at the core of the 
Community, such as free movement-related issues. Furthermore, the Commission has information 
processing resources that are only matched by the foreign ministries of the largest Member States. 
If we canvass the topics being dealt with in the present Convention, the only issue in which the 
Commission does not have substantive and legal expertise is in aspects of foreign and defense policy 
that have traditionally been the remit of national governments. And in general, the Convention 
participants interviewed all agreed that the Commission has been a useful source of substantive and 
legal expertise.
36 Commissioner Vitorino, for example, as Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA), has been able to speak with considerable weight in the sensitive issues of JHA and issues 
relating to the possible incorporation of the EU Charter into the final treaty. 
The informational advantages of the Commission are particularly evident vis-à-vis national 
parliamentarians, who both do not have experience dealing with EU matters, and do not have the back-
up of the Commission civil service or of a national government.
37 To illustrate the low level of 
knowledge of many members of the present Convention, a Convention Secretariat official interviewed 
pointed out that in the Working Group on Legal Personality, when many members heard the 
Commission representative talking about the Commission negotiating an external agreement on first 
pillar issues based upon a mandate from the Council, they perceived it as a rash Commission attempt to 
gain additional powers – not being aware that the Commission was merely rehashing what the status 
quo was.
38  
These relative informational advantages of the Commission were even stronger in the 
Convention on the EU Charter, where the Commission, and especially the Commission’s Legal 
Services, possessed detailed expertise on the legal aspects of the Charter that no other actor in the 
Charter Convention could match.
39  
Comparing these advantages with IGC negotiations, while the Commission has enjoyed 
comparative informational advantages in many of the issues being dealt with, especially those relating to 
the workings of the supranational first pillar, in more political issues such as foreign policy that have 
traditionally been the remit of national governments, they possess fewer advantages – if not relative 
disadvantages.  
                                                 
36 - Series of interviews conducted among national civil servants, Commission and Council Secretariat civil servants, and 
MEP’s and national governmental representatives in Brussels, February 2003.  
37 - Interviews with Commission officials, Brussels, February 2003. (COM 1, 2) 
38 - Interview with Commission official in the Convention Secretariat, Brussels, February 2003. (COM 1) 
39 - Interview with senior Council Secretariat official, Brussels, February 2003. (CS 1)   16
Another advantages of the Commission is the depth of knowledge and experience with treaty 
reform negotiations that it has acquired, especially at the civil servant level. In the last two IGC’s, and 
in the conventions, the Commission has created a task force of officials to back up the Commission 
representatives. Many of these officials have dealt with several treaty reform negotiations, giving them 
comparative advantages vis-à-vis national civil servants, who often are working in their first treaty 
reform negotiations due to frequent rotations in national foreign ministries. At the highest level, 
Commission representative Vitorino took part in the EU Charter negotiations, while Commissioner 
Barnier was the Commission’s representative in the 2000 IGC – giving both Commissioners first-hand 
experience with treaty reform negotiations. In comparison, many national representatives are dealing 
with their first treaty reform negotiation, putting them at a relative disadvantage. 
In comparison to the Commission, members of the EP delegation lack the backing that the 
Commission representatives enjoy. MEP’s are for the most left on their own regarding gathering and 
processing of information in the Convention, although some MEP’s utilize the resources of their 
respective national Permanent Representations to the EU.
40 Despite some MEP’s closely following 
work in IGC’s during the 1990’s, and gaining observer status in the 2000 IGC, the two conventions are 
the first real treaty reform negotiations that MEP’s have been party to. 
While the Council Secretariat cannot match the depth of substantive expertise of the 
Commission, given that the number of the Council Secretariat’s A-grade staff is roughly 10% of the 
Commission’s,
41 in IGC negotiations the Council Secretariat has had strong comparative advantages in 
brokering compromises and finding zones of agreement in comparison to all other actors.
42 Yet in the 
present Convention the Council Secretariat has a significant disadvantage in comparison to an IGC or 
the first convention. While the Council Secretariat IGC team could draw upon the full resources of the 
Council Secretariat, in the current European Convention these officials are seconded to the Convention 
Secretariat, and, upon orders of the Council Secretariat deputy secretary-general Pierre de Boissieu, they 
are formally separated from the rest of the Council Secretariat.
43  They cannot therefore draw upon the 
substantial informational resources of the Council Secretariat.  
 
The perceived acceptability of the contributions of the EU institutions 
While EU institutions have roles in the IGC method, IGC’s are by their very definition conferences of 
governmental representatives – and therefore EU institutions have to be accepted as useful intervening 
                                                 
40 - Interviews with two MEP’s in the Convention, Brussels, February 2003. (EP 1, 3) 
41 - The General Report on the Activities of the European Union lists the size of the staff of both institutions each year. 
42 - Beach, 2002b:94, 147, 177. 
43 - Interview with Council Secretariat official seconded to the Convention Secretariat, Brussels, February 2003.   17
actors by Member States. The impact of this factor has been most evident as regards the EP, with 
France and the UK even vetoing direct EP participation in the 1996-97 IGC.
44 The acceptability of the 
Commission’s role in the past has varied. While the Luxembourg Presidency in 1985 delegated 
extensive informal agenda-setting powers to the Commission, clearly indicating a high level of 
acceptance of their role, after the Commission’s debacle in the Political Union (PU) IGC in September 
1991 they have been a much less welcome guest in IGC’s. For example, in the 1996-97 IGC, the legacy 
of Delors’ high profile in the early 1990’s, coupled with the extreme positions taken by the Commission 
in the IGC, led most Member States to see the Commission as being excessively partial to its own pro-
integrative agenda in its interventions.
45 The Commission had if possible an even lower level of 
acceptance in the 2000 IGC, weakened both by its extreme positions, and the downfall of the Santer 
Commission in March 1999.
46 
  In contrast, in the convention method the level of acceptance of both actors is considerably 
greater, given that both are full players in the convention method. In the present Convention, while 
most of the members of the Convention are aware of the Commission’s agenda, the Commission is 
also seen by most participants as a useful source of both expertise and direction.
47 This acceptance of 
the Commission was perhaps most evident in the choice of Commission representative Barnier to chair 
the sensitive discussions in the working group on defense – something that would have been 
unthinkable in an IGC context. Further, many of the ideas of the Commission that were seen as ‘far 
out’ in the 1996-97 and 2000 IGC’s are now on the agenda of the Convention, such as splitting the 
treaties into constitutional and policy parts.
48 But there is also a clear recognition that the Commission 
is split internally, and that neither Barnier nor Vitorino are speaking for the Commission college as a 
whole, weakening somewhat the legitimacy of their inputs as being truly representative of the 
Commission’s views.
49 
MEP’s are not seen as a source of expertise by other members of the convention, but they do 
have the substantial benefit of being directly elected, and therefore have democratic legitimacy in 
comparison to both the Commission and Council Secretariat. 
                                                 
44 - Maurer, 2002; Galloway, 2001. 
45 - Beach, 2002b:148. 
46 - Beach, 2002b:178. 
47 - Interviews with MEP representatives in the European Convention and with national civil servants, Brussels, February 
2003. 
48 - See Commission, 1999, 2000. 
49 - Interview with EP member of the Convention, Brussels, February 2003; ??? MORE???   18
  While the Council Secretariat has played an accepted ‘vital cog’ role in the intergovernmental 
IGC method used since the 1990-91 IGC’s,
50 the Council Secretariat has been relegated from its central 
role in the present Convention. Whether this reflects distrust of the Council Secretariat’s role in the 
Commission and EP is difficult to verify, but there is evidence that there was behind-the-scenes 
jockeying by both the EP and Commission, in collaboration with the Belgian Presidency, in the fall of 
2001 to ensure that the Convention Secretariat that was created was a collaborative institution including 
officials from the EP and Commission Secretariats, instead of being compromised mainly of Council 
Secretariat officials as was the case in the EU Charter Convention – illustrating perhaps the lower level 
of acceptability and trust that the Council Secretariat possesses in the convention method.
51 
 
4.b. Comparing the possibilities for influence opened by the change in 
negotiating context 
 
What impact do the different negotiating contexts have upon the ability of EU institutions to translate 
their bargaining resources into influence over outcomes in treaty reform negotiations? In the following 
the impact of the context will be discussed. The section shows that the Commission had many 
opportunities to attempt to shape outcomes in the SEA and EMU IGC’s that used the community IGC 
method, whereas in the PU IGC, and the negotiation of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, the shift 
to the intergovernmental IGC method opened for many possibilities for the Council Secretariat to gain 
influence. The shift to the convention method has affected the possibilities to gain influence of all three 
actors, strengthening both the EP and Commission, and in the present convention has significantly 
limited the opportunities for the Council Secretariat to gain influence (see figure 2).  
 
Institutional set-up 
What roles do the EU institutions play in the two negotiating methods, and what potential impact does 
their institutional position have upon their abilities to translate their bargaining resources into influence 
over outcomes in the two methods? 
  Looking first at the IGC methods, an IGC is defined in Article 48 EU as a ‘conference of 
representatives of the governments of the Member States’. The Commission’s role in the community 
method IGC’s was relatively strong, but in the past two IGC’s held using the intergovernmental 
                                                 
50 - See Beach, 2002b, 2003 for more.  
51 - Interviews with Commission and Council Secretariat officials, Brussels, February 2003. (COM 2, CS 2)   19
method, the Commission had a relatively weak role.
52 Article 48 EU gives the Commission the right to 
put forward a proposal for an IGC, but its actual role is based upon precedence developed since the 
1985 IGC.
53 This has allowed the Commission to play an active role in IGC’s, attending meetings 
including the European Council Summits, and has allowed it to submit proposals. Additionally, in 
IGC’s national delegations and Presidencies have often turned to the Commission for substantive 
advice and expertise, for example by inviting an opinion from the Commission on a specific proposal, 
or by asking the Commission for advice during the drafting process.
54 
Looking at specific IGC’s, the Luxembourg Presidency in 1985 delegated informal control of the 
agenda to the Commission in the 1985 IGC that negotiated the SEA, enabling the Commission to table 
a series of proposals that set the substantive agenda for the IGC.
55 Further, the Commission played a 
key role in the behind-the-scenes drafting process, together with the Presidency. The Commission was 
in 1988 through institutional politics able to convince Member States to give it a central role in the 
agenda-setting phase of the EMU IGC, giving Delors the chair of an expert committee that set the 
agenda for the IGC.
56 Yet in the parallel Political Union (PU) IGC, the Commission opted for a 
stronger political role, and eschewed taking part in the drafting process, and was not given a privileged 
initiating role as in the SEA IGC.
57 The Commission had a very weak role in the negotiation of both 
the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice – in effect playing the role of an unwelcome guest to the IGC’s. 
  The EP has had an almost non-existent role in past IGC negotiations, prevented from attending 
meetings or submitting proposals, although they did have an observer role in the 2000 IGC. The EP 
was forced to rely upon: discussions in the margins of IGC’s; upon adopting opinions prior to and 
during IGC negotiations; and attempts to link their assent with the outcome to issues where they had a 
vote, and that were important to Member States. 
  The Council Secretariat role in IGC’s is based upon mandates given to it by the European 
Council prior to the convening of an IGC. Its basic function is to offer secretarial assistance to the IGC 
and the Presidency chairing the IGC; but in practice it plays a very significant behind-the-scenes role 
that offers it many opportunities to translate its bargaining resources into influence over outcomes.
58 
While the Council Secretariat had a weak role in the SEA and EMU IGC’s, the Council Secretariat has 
had a more central role in the past two IGC’s that have been negotiated using the intergovernmental 
                                                 
52 - See Beach, 2002b for a comparative analysis of the Commission’s role since the 1985 IGC. 
53 - Gray, 2002; Dinan, 2000. 
54 - Beach, 2002b. 
55 - Beach, 2002b:57-80; de Ruyt, 1987; Ross, 1995:32. 
56 - Beach, 2002b, chapter 7; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999:712-713; McAllister, 1997:201-202. 
57 - Interview with former Council Secretariat official, Telephone, January 2002. 
58 - See Beach, 2003.   20
IGC method. The Council Secretariat has prepared almost all of the draft legal texts and other 
documents for the IGC’s, and has also offered suggestions and ideas to receptive Presidencies on how 
to reach an acceptable agreement – though in the 2000 IGC the Paris-based French Presidency that 
presided over the IGC end-game undertook many of these functions themselves.
59 Further, the Council 
Secretariat’s Legal Services provided sole legal advice to the IGC in the past four IGC’s, giving it a 
monopoly of authoritative legal advice to the IGC.
60 The centrality of the Council Secretariat was 
especially evident in the 1996-97 IGC that negotiated the Treaty of Amsterdam, where both the Irish 
and Dutch Presidencies as small states were quite dependent upon the resources of the Council 
Secretariat, giving the Secretariat numerous opportunities to attempt to influence outcomes. 
  In the convention method, the roles of the Commission and EP have been strengthened, 
whereas in the convention method, the Council Secretariat has a weaker role. Both the Commission 
and EP are full parties to the negotiations, and were/are part of the Presidium. In the EU Charter 
Convention the EP and Commission had one member in the Presidium, whereas they have two seats in 
the present Convention’s Presidium. Especially the seats in the Presidium mark an increase in the 
institutional role of the Commission and EP, as this opens for a range of potential options to shape the 
convention agenda by having a strong say in how the negotiations are conducted and what issues are on 
the agenda. For example, in the current Convention, members of the Presidium were chosen to chair 
working groups on specific issues in the fall of 2002. As the chair of a working group, they were in 
charge of the conduct of the meetings of the group, and the drafting of the final report. While these 
reports then had to be approved by the plenary assembly, by having the chair this opened for 
significant opportunities for Commission and EP representatives to shape the emerging agenda of the 
convention. 
Yet being in the Presidium can also be strategic disadvantage for the Commission, for once the 
Presidium has made a decision, both of the representatives of the Commission are then forced to back 
it in order to preserve the collegiality of the institution. In comparison, while the two members of the 
EP in the Presidium are forced to support a Presidium position in the plenary, this does not prevent 
the other fourteen members of the EP delegation from criticizing a Presidium decision. 
  While the Council Secretariat formed the ‘task force’ that was entrusted with assisting the 
Presidium in the drafting of the EU Charter in 2000, and therefore had a very privileged institutional 
position, the Council Secretariat has been significantly weakened in the present European Convention, 
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being relegated to being part of a team of officials drawn from the secretariats of the Commission, EP, 
and seconded national officials.  
The Council Secretariat played a very strong role in the EU Charter, and in many respects had 
even greater autonomy than it enjoys in IGC’s or the current Convention, as its ‘master’ (the chairman 
Roman Herzog) was for most of the convention afar in Germany for personal reasons, and not in 
Brussels as a Brussels-based Member States Presidency in an IGC is, giving the Council Secretariat 
significant leeway.
61 Further, there were only rarely discussions within the Presidium on issues before 
the Council Secretariat started to draft texts and papers for the plenary, as the exercise was perceived by 
most key actors to be about codifying existing rights in European law – enabling the Council Secretariat 
as will be seen below to interpret existing rights in a manner that reflected its own preferred outcome.
62 
In the present European Convention the Council Secretariat officials are seconded to the 
Convention Secretariat, and formally independent of the Council Secretariat itself. Insiders also point 
out though that deputy Secretary-General de Boissieu actively lobbied to get Sir John Kerr, former UK 
Permanent Representative to the EU, appointed as head of the Convention Secretariat.
63 This was 
perhaps because Kerr’s pragmatic and pro-Council views overlap with the pro-Council preferences of 
the Council Secretariat.
64 
Another potential channel for Council Secretariat influence has been the use of expert hearings in 
the conventions. Council Secretariat officials have been used as sources of expertise, but these hearings 
are similar to committee hearings in national parliaments, and they use multiple experts. In comparison, 
in IGC’s the Council Secretariat’s Legal Services has a monopoly on provision of legal expertise. 
  An institutional factor that might potentially grant the Council Secretariat opportunities to gain 
influence in the European Convention is if it is put in charge of the ‘tidying up’ of the final document 
of the Convention by the European Council after its presentation to the Thessaloniki Summit in June 
2003. This could potentially offer the Council Secretariat numerous opportunities to subtly shift 
outcomes, as it did in the 2000 IGC when entrusted with the task of ‘tidying up’ the Treaty of Nice. In 
the 2000 IGC the Council Secretariat significantly shifted the outcome of the IGC in Article 66 EC, 
which deals with co-operation between departments of national administrations, and between these and 
the Commission. In Nice the heads of state and government indicated that they wanted to move the 
article to QMV, but they did not decide whether co-decision with the EP should apply for the Article, 
                                                 
61 - Interview with senior Council Secretariat official, Brussels, February 2003. (CS 1) Most Presidencies are Brussels-based, 
centered on the Member State’s Permanent Representation to the EU, in contrast to a capital-based Presidency (e.g. the 
French Presidency in the fall of 2000). Capital-based Presidencies usually do not use the Council Secretariat extensively. 
62 - Interview with senior Council Secretariat official, Brussels, February 2003. (CS 1) 
63 - Interview with Council Secretariat official, Brussels, February 2003. (CS 2) 
64 - For more on Council Secretariat preferences, see Beach, 2002b; 2003.   22
merely stating that the mechanism for Article 67 EC should be used.
65 However they overlooked the 
fact that Article 67 EC called for co-decision. In the process of tidying up the Treaty in the first months 
of 2001, the Secretariat first put in a declaration stating that the provision would switch to QMV in 
2004 without co-decision, and then changed this to a legally binding protocol in the final Treaty text.
66 
While the Secretariat based these changes upon legal arguments, it is not difficult to see it as an example 
of the Secretariat’s interests in strengthening the Council contra other EU institutions (the EP). 
  In comparison to the relatively weak role of the Council Secretariat in the present Convention, 
the Convention Secretariat itself plays a central role. The Convention Secretariat has been made 
responsible for: summarizing discussions in both the working groups and the plenary assembly; 
summarizing the amendments proposed by members of the plenary to the Presidium’s draft treaty 
proposals; and drafting texts for the Presidium.
67 The Convention Secretariat was central in the 
‘listening’ phase of the Convention, providing documents and questions to the plenary in order to get 
the debate started.
68 The opportunities to shape the agenda are even greater in the drafting phase, 
where the Convention Secretariat is responsible for distilling the numerous submissions, amendments, 
and reports from the plenary and working groups into a final Constitutional Treaty. The Presidium and 
plenary will naturally have to accept Convention Secretariat drafts, but given the complex nature of 
many of the issues, this opens for many opportunities to subtly skew outcomes. It remains to be seen 
though whether the Convention Secretariat will attempt to exploit this. Further, it is also difficult to see 
in which direction the Convention Secretariat would push outcomes given its divergent composition 
and the lack of a clear institutional identity, in contrast to the clear pro-integrative and pro-Council bias 
of the Council Secretariat.
69 
 
Nature of the issues being negotiated 
If we compare the nature of the issues being dealt with in two conventions with past IGC’s, both the 
SEA and Treaty of Amsterdam IGC’s, together with the two conventions have dealt with numerous 
relatively technical and non-salient issues with certain exceptions, while the 2000 IGC that negotiated 
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the Treaty of Nice dealt with only a few highly sensitive and simple institutional issues, opening for 
fewer opportunities for EU institutions to translate their bargaining resources into influence over 
outcomes. 
The SEA IGC in 1985 dealt with predominately low salience and technical decisions – opening 
for many opportunities for the Commission to influence outcomes – although the issues of foreign 
policy and social policy were politically sensitive. The EMU and PU IGC’s in 1990-91 dealt with 
extremely complex and sensitive issues. In the 1996-97 IGC in contrast, a vast majority of the over 200 
issues that were discussed were both relatively technical and complex, and not politically sensitive. This 
opened for numerous opportunities for EU institutions to translate informational advantages into 
influence over outcomes.
70 Yet one of the key issues - the central institutional triangle of re-weighting 
of Council votes, number of Commissioners, and the extension of majority voting – was both relatively 
simple and extremely sensitive, pitting Member States directly against each other. In this type of 
sensitive institutional issue, ‘Compromises did not lie in skillful drafting or the gradual refining of texts. 
These were points of gut difference and fundamental importance such as cannot be resolved until the 
end of any negotiation.’
71 Therefore we would expect that EU institutions would be strongly 
constrained in these types of issues. 
  There were only a few highly salient issues on the agenda of the 2000 IGC, including the sensitive 
institutional triangle involved issues that were either zero-sum issues and/or that dealt with sensitive 
matters of national prestige. Several of the sensitive issues were though also quite complex, such as 
reforms of social security co-ordination (Article 42 EC) and the common trade policy (Article 133 EC), 
opening for certain opportunities for EU institutions to gain influence. 
  Comparing the issues in these two IGC’s with the two conventions, the EU Charter Convention 
dealt with highly complex legal questions relating to jurisprudence of the ECJ, the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.
72 These issues opened for numerous 
opportunities for legal experts in the Commission and Council Secretariat to exploit their expertise to 
gain influence. There were though two issues in the Charter negotiations that were also politically 
sensitive - the questions of the scope of the Charter, especially whether it should include social rights, 
and whether the Charter should be legally binding.  
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The topics on the agenda of the present EU Convention have been divided into eleven main 
categories by the Presidium and plenary.
73 Perusing the list of topics, issues such as the simplification of 
the treaties, legal personality, and competence issues are highly complex both legally and substantively, 
requiring detailed knowledge of the existing acquis communautaire.
74 The Convention has even taken the 
consequence of the complexity of the complete re-working of the EU Treaties by ‘sub-contracting’ 
certain aspects of the simplification exercise to a working party of legal experts in the Convention 
Secretariat.
75 In these types of issues we should expect that expert actors would have discretion to 
shape discussions and outcomes.  
Yet as the EU Convention is in effect re-negotiating the EU Treaties and the complex web of 
compromises underlying them, there are many politically sensitive issues being raised. Among these are 
questions of extending EU competences, particularly in the fields of social policy and defense. Further 
are the institutional questions such as the external representation of the Union and the possible creation 
of a European president – issues which have already raised heated political debate throughout Europe, 
especially after the Franco-German proposals in January 2003.
76 In these types of issues, we would, 
other things equal, expect lower levels of influence for EU institutions, given that the final outcome will 
have to be accepted by the Member States within an IGC, and they will try to keep close tabs on these 
sensitive issues. 
 
Level of complexity of the negotiating situation 
Is the level of complexity of the negotiating situation significantly different in the convention method 
from the IGC methods? If we look at the number of parties first, the SEA IGC in 1985 had 
representatives from ten Member States, along with the Commission. The 1990-91 IGC’s had 
representatives from twelve governments, together with the Commission, whereas the 1996-97 and 
2000 IGC’s involved seventeen actors – fifteen national representatives, including the government 
holding the Presidency; a representative of the Commission; and the Council Secretariat as assistant to 
the IGC and Presidency.  In these IGC’s, all of the actors could sit around a single (relatively large) 
table.  
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  This relatively simple situation contrasts sharply with the convention method, where a single 
negotiating table has been replaced by the conference chambers of the European Parliament in 
Brussels. In the EU Charter Convention there were a total of sixty-two full members representing 
national governments, the EP, Commission, and national parliaments, together with the President, 
Roman Herzog. The current Convention encompasses 105 full members, including representatives of 
the national parliaments and governments of the accession countries – if we include alternates, who 
participate actively in the Convention, then the number rises to over 200. In such complex negotiation 
contexts, it becomes very difficult for parties to identify possible agreements, increasing the demand for 
leadership and brokerage which can be supplied by EU institutions. This is especially evident in the 
drafting process in the European Convention, where it is naturally a physically impossibility to have 105 
delegates holding the pen collectively. 
  If we then turn to investigate the differences in the number of issues in past IGC’s and in the 
conventions, both the 2000 IGC and the EU Charter Convention dealt with only a handful of issues. In 
the 2000 IGC there were two primary cleavages: strengthening EU institutions contra preserving the 
status quo; and between smaller and larger Member States.
77 The main questions in the EU Charter 
negotiations dealt with whether the document should be legally binding, and the nature and scope of 
EU competences in fundamental rights (especially whether they should be extended to include social 
rights and more positive rights),
78 although there were many options on the table, with a total of 205 
written contributions and over 1,400 proposed amendments.
79 
The patterns of cleavages in the other IGC’s and the current European Convention were 
immensely complex, with many cross-cutting cleavages. In the 1996-97 IGC for instance, there were 
numerous cleavages across the over 200 issues, with no clear overlapping cleavages.
80 The current 
European Convention is if anything even more complex, with a multitude of cleavages among the 105 
members, who represent a much more diverse group of interests than is represented in an IGC.
81 Up 
until now the strongest cleavage in the Convention has been in the question of social policy, both 
within the working group on Social Europe and in the plenary debates. But it is still early days in the 
Convention, given that the convention only now is turning from the deliberative listening and study 
phases to the drafting phase, and the real strength of different cleavages is likely to become more 
evident as the Convention enters the end-game in May and June 2003. 
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4.c. Conclusions – the possibilities of influence across time of EU institutions 
 
In conclusion, the different methods used to negotiate treaty reform have substantially changed the 
different possibilities open to EU institutions in their attempts to gain influence over outcomes. These 
possibilities are depicted heuristically in figure 3, where the specific points of the actors at specific times 
are intended to be merely illustrative. The figure depicts a composite measure of the impact of the three 
contextual factors, showing how the range of opportunities to gain influence has varied significantly 
over time and across institutions. 
  
  
Figure 3 – The possibilities opened by changes in the negotiating context for EU institutions to gain 
influence over treaty reform outcomes. 
 
  The Commission had many opportunities to gain influence in the SEA and EMU IGC’s – 
possessing a privileged institutional position, and where the complexity of the issues gave the 
Commission relative advantages. In the following IGC’s that were negotiated using the 
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intergovernmental IGC method, the institutional position of the Commission was substantially 
weakened. Further, the more political issues such as foreign policy and defense were the home turf of 
national governments, and the sensitivity of many of the issues in the IGC’s led governments to keep 
close tabs on the negotiations – thereby restricting the range of possibilities available to the 
Commission. 
The Council Secretariat in contrast was in a relatively weak position in the SEA and EMU IGC’s, 
but gained a privileged role in the more intergovernmental IGC’s. This was especially evident in the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam, where the Secretariat had a very privileged position, the 
negotiations dealt with many complex issues where the Secretariat had comparative informational 
advantages, and the complexity of the negotiating situation created a strong demand for brokerage – 
something that the Secretariat has comparative advantages in providing.  
  The Council Secretariat also had a strong position in the EU Charter Convention due to its 
central institutional position, the legal complexity of the issues, and the complexity of the negotiating 
situation – whereas the Council Secretariat has been significantly weakened in the present European 
Convention. 
  The EP’s possibilities to gain influence have been very low until the shift to the convention 
method, being previously forced to adopt declarations and opinions that had little if any impact. In the 
convention method the EP is a full player, and even has seats in the Presidium chairing the 
negotiations, and therefore has many opportunities to attempt to gain influence over outcomes. 
 
Section 5 – The impact of strategy in the negotiations 
 
The following section will briefly look at whether EU institutions have been able to translate the 
possibilities that they possess into real influence over outcomes. It is naturally not enough to have three 
of a kind in a game of poker to win – one has to know when to hold and fold one’s cards to win. Were 
EU institutions then able to convert the range of opportunities opened by the negotiating context into 
influence over outcomes in either IGC’s or the conventions? The following will first briefly discuss 
what factors led EU institutions to be successful in IGC negotiations. These results will then be 
compared with the conventions. Given that the present European Convention is not finished at the 
time of the writing of this paper, it is naturally impossible to make firm conclusions on actor influence 
over outcomes, and therefore only tentative conclusions will be made regarding the impact of the 
process in the European Convention. 
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The success of Council Secretariat strategies in IGC negotiations 
It was seen above that the Council Secretariat had few opportunities to gain influence in the SEA and 
EMU IGC’s. In contrast, especially the context of the 1996-97 IGC opened for many opportunities for 
the Council Secretariat which were skillfully taken. The Council Secretariat was influential in the 1006-
97 IGC due to a combination of its high level of expertise, its reputation as a trusted intervening actor, 
its privileged institutional position, and the skillful use of pragmatic and behind-the-scenes agenda-
shaping and brokering strategies. This was most evident in the negotiation of the issue of flexibility, 
where Secretariat interventions substantially shifted the agenda away from a form of ‘hard core’ dealing 
primarily with CFSP. The Secretariat proved able to significantly shift the agenda through its drafts and 
proposals that it produced, leading to the creation of a complex legal formula that included many 
institutional safeguards, and even excluded CFSP!
82  
When the Secretariat was allowed by the Presidencies in charge of the IGC, the Secretariat also 
stepped in and supplied brokerage in the IGC negotiations, using a variety of brokering tactics. The 
Secretariat brokered compromises in Article 133 EC, and in the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In both instances, the Secretariat both ensured that a compromise 
agreement was reached, while also skewing outcomes closer to its own preferred outcome. Tellingly, 
the final deal brokered by the Secretariat placed the new post of High Representative for CFSP within 
the Council Secretariat itself by significantly upgrading the post of Secretary General of the Council, 
thereby also strengthening the institutional prestige of the Council Secretariat in the process. 
The negotiation of the Treaty of Nice clearly showed that despite a weak position, the skillful use 
of appropriate strategies also allowed the Secretariat to influence outcomes. All three contextual 
variables placed the Secretariat in a weak position (see figure 2). Yet despite this difficult situation, the 
Secretariat was able to step in and shape the IGC agenda in several cases. For instance, during the 
Finnish Presidency that prepared the IGC agenda, deputy Secretary-General de Boissieu ‘chopped up’ 
the draft Finnish Presidency conclusions, utilizing his institutional position in order to exclude issues 
that were unwanted by the Secretariat.
83 Additionally, the Secretariat was able to successfully insert 
several of its ‘pet projects’ in the IGC end-game through clever agenda-setting, such as a declaration on 
inter-institutional agreements.
84 
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The success of Council Secretariat strategies in convention method 
The context of the first convention negotiating the EU Charter opened for a range of opportunities for 
the Council Secretariat to gain influence. The combination of its comparative informational advantages 
in the legally complex issues under discussion, and its privileged institutional position opened many 
options for Secretariat attempts to influence outcomes. 
  The Secretariat controlled the ‘input’ and ‘output’ of the convention, and if we compare the first 
draft of the charter, which the Secretariat drafted quite autonomously, and the final draft, there are few 
changes, with only eight or nine new articles that were not included in the first draft.
85 However the 
level of Secretariat influence here should not be overstated, for the final draft was adopted by 
consensus, meaning that a significant majority had to be able to ‘find themselves’ in the final Charter.
86 
We can therefore also interpret the lack of changes in the drafts to the successful anticipation by the 
Council Secretariat of zones of agreement. 
  However the Secretariat was able to shift outcomes in several key areas.
87 If we focus on the use 
of agenda-shaping strategies by the Secretariat, the Secretariat had considerable success with using 
subtle, behind-the-scenes tactics, thereby gaining considerable influence upon the outcome.
88 For 
instance, the Secretariat produced slightly biased briefings asked for by the chair in areas such as the 
scope of the charter, and the holders of the rights which shifted outcomes closer to the Secretariat’s 
own preferred outcome.
89 The head of the Secretariat’s team, Jean-Paul Jacqué, had a restrictive view of 
what the EC’s competences to promote human rights should be.
90 This skepticism was then transferred 
into the drafts that were produced for the convention by the Secretariat, and that then made their way 
into the final drafts.
91 These restrictive views did not reflect the majority view within the Convention.
92 
Further, perhaps reflecting the Secretariat’s own institutional interests, the Secretariat ensured that the 
scope of the Charter was limited to the Member States; excluding EU institutions.
93 
  There are fewer opportunities for the Council Secretariat to gain influence in the present 
Convention, as they have a much weaker position, with few instruments available to attempt to skew 
                                                 
85 - Deloche-Gaudez, 2001:27; de Búrca, 2001. 
86 - Deloche-Gaudez, 2001:29. 
87 - de Búrca, 2001:134; Maurer, 2003:179-180. 
88 - Deloche-Gaudez, 2001:14, 27. de Búrca, 2001. 
89 - de Búrca, 2001:134. 
90 - Ibid.  
91 - de Búrca, 2001.  
92 - Ibid. 
93 - de Búrca, 2001:136.   30
outcomes closer to their own preferred vision of the EU.
94 At present there are no examples of 
successful Council Secretariat attempts to overcome these deficiencies to shape the Convention agenda. 
 
The success of Commission strategies in IGC negotiations 
In both the SEA and EMU IGC’s, the Commission successfully used pragmatic agenda-shaping and 
brokerage strategies to gain significant influence over outcomes. In the 1985 IGC, the Commission 
successfully lobbied the Member States to take seriously their commitment in the Treaty of Rome to 
create a functioning Internal Market, exploiting the window of opportunity created to publish its White 
Paper and link it with the IGC, thereby expanding the zone of possible agreements to include new 
issues. In the actual negotiations, the Commission put forward a series of pragmatic proposals that 
aimed at the upper end of what Member States would accept, skewing outcomes closer to their own 
preferred outcome in areas such as the scope of the Internal Market.
95 In the EMU IGC, the 
Commission successfully exploited its institutional position in the agenda-setting phase, creating a final 
report that formed an authoritative focal point for the ensuing IGC, as it was signed by all of the 
central bank governors, including the German.  
In contrast, the Commission attempted to play a strong political role in the PU IGC, giving up its 
behind-the-scenes functions in order to act as the ‘champion of Europe’.
96 The strong advocacy of an 
extreme position in the IGC was most clearly seen in the Commission support for the Dutch first draft 
treaty in September 1991, which controversially reversed the growing consensus in the draft treaty 
produced in the preceding Luxembourg Presidency. 
The Commission had a weak institutional position in the 1996-97 IGC, but also proved 
unsuccessful in translating the few opportunities it possessed due to poor negotiating tactics. While the 
Commission was influential in several low salience and complex institutional issues, the overall picture 
was one of low Commission influence upon the final Treaty of Amsterdam. For instance the proposals 
put forward by the Commission were for the most far outside of the zone of possible agreements, and 
therefore had little impact in most issue areas – most evident in CFSP. This was exacerbated by the low 
level of acceptability of the Commission’s interventions, which also prevented the Commission from 
playing a brokering role in the IGC end-game. 
If anything, things went even worse for the Commission in the 2000 IGC. A variety of factors 
played in, including a low level of perceived acceptability, the type of issue involved, and poor 
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negotiating tactics, with top Commission officials blundering the negotiation of several important 
dossiers.
97 The Commission had poor relations with the Portuguese Presidency, who believed that the 
Commission was following a large Member State agenda. The Commission had even worse relations 
with the French Presidency, which seemed to go out of its way to alienate and exclude the Commission 
from the negotiations.  
  Yet this picture of low Commission influence contrasts sharply with Commission influence in the 
negotiation of judicial reforms within the Friends of the Presidency group. Here clever institutional 
politics by the Commission ensured the creation of a favorable institutional forum for the negotiations. 
An ‘epistemic’ community of like-minded actors was created by the Commission, first in the working 
group prior to the IGC, and then in the Friends of the Presidency. The Commission was interested in 
having the negotiations held in a ‘technical’ forum among national legal advisers, for it believed that 
legal advisers would be much less critical of the ECJ and its strongly pro-integrative role than national 
political representatives, and therefore would agree upon an outcome closer to the preferred outcome 
of the Commission. Further, the Commission succeeded in securing a privileged position in the group; 
for example the Commission drafted the agenda for the discussions in both groups.
98 
 
The success of Commission strategies in the convention method 
In the first convention, Vitorino as the Commission representative wanted to incorporate the Charter 
into the Treaties,
99 but proved unsuccessful in this. But the Council Secretariat did draw extensively on 
the expertise of the Commission in social rights
100 - whether the Commission was able to translate this 
into influence is difficult to determine with the available information though.
  
  In the present European Convention, the Commission was active in setting the agenda for the 
Convention, and in ensuring that the convention method was used instead of one of the IGC 
methods.
101 Together with the Belgian Presidency, the Commission shaped the Laeken conclusions, and 
succeeded in expanding the agenda to include issues that were in the Commission opinion in the 2000 
IGC.
102 In the present Convention, when the Commission has played a low-profile and realistic role, it 
has had considerable impact upon the proceedings, being able to shape the agenda to reflect its own 
priorities. But the Commission has often played themselves out of the picture by not adopting 
positions in the college, and by pursuing a two-pronged and uncoordinated strategy. This dichotomy 
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has reflected tensions within the Commission, for example between the two Commission 
representatives and the college of Commissioners, and between the Commission task force and the 
representatives.
103 These splits were displayed vividly in December 2002, where on the same day the 
Commission tabled both a relatively realistic and operational opinion together with a radical draft treaty 
that was termed ‘Penelope’.
104  
  While the opinion was produced by the two Commission representatives, the Penelope paper was 
produced by a team of Commission civil servants directly under the authority of Commission President 
Prodi, and according to inside sources, it was kept secret from the Commission representatives until 
after it was published.
105 The Penelope document has been generally ill-received in the convention due 
to its radical nature, and many members have seen the draft as ‘pre-empting’ their work.
106 
In comparison, in issues where the Commission has intervened with well-organized and 
reasonable positions, it has been able to exploit the negotiating context to gain influence over the 
agenda. One example was in the working group on ‘Social Europe’. The Commission appointed 
Commission Secretary-General Sullivan as its representative to the working group. He presented a clear 
case in the group, and succeeded in putting the issue of public health on the agenda, and shaped the 
final report of the group.
107 Sullivan argued that the EU should have competence under Article 152 EC 
to deal with cross-border issues of public health, and especially problems such as communicable 
diseases and bioterrorism.
108 According to participants in the working group, Sullivan’s argumentation 
was very persuasive and knowledgeable, and also made clear to skeptics 
 what the Commission did not 
intend to do with new competences.
109 
  Another example was Commission representative Vitorino’s chairing of working group on the 
Charter, where he helped secure final report that reflected the Commission priority of including the 
Charter as a legally binding agreement into the draft Constitution, while also taking on board British 
and Irish concerns.
110 
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The (lack of) success of the EP’s strategies in the IGC method 
In comparison to the two other EU institutions, the EP has had very little success in shaping IGC 
outcomes. This is perhaps ironic, for the EP has been the main institutional winner across the IGC’s, 
with its powers increased from only being consulted by the Council to being a co-legislator together 
with the Council in the co-decision procedure. In IGC’s in general, the EP has often put forward quite 
extreme policy positions in declarations that have for the most been ignored by IGC participants.
111 
 
The success of the EP’s strategies in the convention method 
The manner in which the conventions have been negotiated opens for many opportunities for EP 
influence, especially as the debates are more open and deliberative than in IGC negotiations. This can 
be interpreted as a shift to a more problem-solving atmosphere in contrast to tougher bargaining 
atmosphere that is often prevalent in IGC’s, and especially in final European Council Summits 
concluding IGC’s.
112 
  The EP has in general a much stronger position in the convention method than in IGC’s. This is 
especially evident when groups of MEP’s have been able to co-ordinate their positions, enabling them 
to speak with one voice, thereby providing leadership in a very complex negotiating situation. Further, 
they actively sought to form coalitions based upon political lines, drawing upon national 
parliamentarians of similar parties.
113 
While the EP did not secure a legally binding Charter – primarily due to the British veto, through 
agreements to co-operate between two main parties within convention, a majority of MEP’s used 
coalition-building tactics to build support for certain amendments that made their way into the final 
draft Charter, such as the right to strike and work that were clearly unacceptable to some members of 
the convention.
114  
In the present Convention, the EP delegation is one of the driving forces, together with the 
Presidium.
115 MEP’s have for example actively used ad hoc coalition-building tactics to attempt to 
influence the agenda and thereby also outcomes. MEP Andrew Duff has been one of the most active 
coalition-builders in the European Convention, and has for example recently created a coalition that 
put forward a contribution to the Convention signed by twelve full members, ten alternates, and three 
observers. The paper canvasses areas where they all agree, including on generalization of the co-
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decision procedure, and the election of the President of the Commission by the EP.
116 While it is 
impossible to tell at present whether this will influence the final outcome, it will also be difficult for the 
Presidium to ignore the ‘common denominators’ that are proposed by such a large coalition. 
Yet the relative success of EP tactics in the current Convention will depend largely on whether 
the MEP’s can work together and follow a relatively modest problem-solving tack that will allow a 
compromise outcome to be agreed upon by a large majority. In contrast, if the EP increasingly resorts 
to overly ambitious positions as the Commission did in IGC’s in the 1990’s, there could cut themselves 
out of influence.  
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Section 6 - Conclusions 
 
The conclusion discusses these findings and their implications for the way in which we study treaty 
reform negotiations in the EU, pointing the direction towards more explicit theoretical models that 
detail how different negotiating contexts are different, and what impacts these differences have upon 
outcomes.  
  As existing theories of European integration either discount or ‘black box’ the analytical 
significance of negotiation processes, this paper first presented a bargaining model that attempts to 
explain how the context and conduct of the negotiation process mattered for the ability of EU 
institutions to translate potential bargaining resources into influence over outcomes. Following this 
three ‘ideal type’ treaty reform methods were reviewed. 
This paper examined the impact of the negotiating context and conduct of the negotiations 
within the three treaty reform methods, and the opportunities and constraints imposed by the 
institutional context and the manner of conduct upon the ability of the Commission, Council 
Secretariat, and European Parliament to gain influence. What impact then has the change in negotiating 
methods had upon their ability to gain influence in treaty reform negotiations? Has the change to the 
convention method mattered? 
  Looking first at the bargaining resources of EU institutions in the different contexts, both the 
Council Secretariat and Commission have extensive expertise that can be brought to bear in treaty 
reform negotiations (informational bargaining resources), whereas the primary bargaining resource of 
the EP in the convention method is its democratic legitimacy (level of acceptability), and size of its 
contingent in the conventions (material bargaining resources). 
  The context of the three methods opens for different opportunities for EU institutions to gain 
influence. While the Council Secretariat enjoyed a privileged institutional position in the 
intergovernmental IGC method, and in the EU Charter convention, in the present European 
Convention the Council Secretariat’s jobs have been taken over by an ad hoc Convention Secretariat 
that is formally independent of the Council Secretariat. In contrast, the roles of the Commission and 
EP are significantly strengthened in the convention method, with the Commission going from being an 
unwelcome guest in the intergovernmental IGC method used in the 1996-97 and 2000 IGC’s to a full 
partner in the convention method, even having a seat on the presidium of the conventions. The EP had 
no role in IGC’s prior to 2000, and only had an observer role in that IGC, but has enjoyed a much 
more central role in the convention method – gaining a large number of seats, and also gaining places 
on the presidiums of the conventions. Further, the technical complexity of many of the issues being   36
negotiated in the two conventions, and the increased complexity of the negotiating situation of over 
100 actors in the present Convention, has also opened for numerous opportunities for EU institutions 
to translate informational resources into influence. 
  Yet for the institutions to gain influence they had to play their cards successfully in the 
negotiations. It was found that the Council Secretariat was influential in the 1996-97 IGC and EU 
Charter convention due to the use of low-profile tactics – for example providing suggestive issue 
briefings for Presidencies in IGC’s, or the Presidium in the Charter Convention. When the 
Commission used similar low-profile strategies in the SEA and EMU IGC’s, they were also relative 
successful in translating possible influence into real influence. But in later IGC’s, and to some extent in 
the present Convention, the Commission has played its cards poorly, presenting often both extreme 
and incoherent positions. When the Commission used lower-profile and realistic interventions in the 
current Convention, they were though able to translate their expertise into influence. Examples of this 
include Sullivan’s interventions in the working group on ‘Social Europe’ in the present Convention. 
  The EP had few possibilities to gain influence in IGC’s, but has gained many opportunities to 
gain influence in the convention method. In both conventions the primary method that the EP has 
used to attempt to gain influence, given that they do not have extensive informational bargaining 
resources, has been coalition-building tactics aimed at creating support for their own preferred 
outcomes. Yet as with the other institutions, the relative success of their tactics is also dependent upon 
whether they adopt moderate positions, or whether they choose to strongly advocate extreme policy 
positions. For instance, if the EP proves able through coalition-building to achieve a strongly pro-
federal final Treaty that reflects its own preferred outcome, it is highly probable that this extreme 
outcome would be unacceptable to certain Member States (UK, Denmark, France), and that these 
states would politely but resolutely put the draft Treaty into the bin and start afresh in an IGC context.  
Finally, the impact of the change in negotiating method highlights the impact of institutional 
politics prior to and during treaty reform negotiations. Actions to actually change an unfavorable 
institutional structure can often be a more effective means of gaining possibilities to influence 
outcomes than other negotiating strategies.
117 If one is unsatisfied with how the game is going, the best 
strategy is often to change the rules of the game itself. 
  Concluding, this paper showed how the change in negotiating methods of treaty reform has 
affected the relative abilities of EU institutions to affect outcomes. When EU institutions had central 
institutional roles, issues were low salience and relatively technical, and when the negotiating situation 
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itself was highly complex, EU institutions had many possibilities to gain influence. Successful strategies to 
translate these opportunities into real influence over outcomes were usually low-profile – for instance 
when the Council Secretariat subtly exploited the power of the pen to shift draft texts closer to their 
own preferred pro-integrative and pro-Council preferences. The argument here is therefore not that 
EU institutions are necessary to ensure agreement in treaty reform negotiations, but that their 
interventions can make a difference, though within the broad bounds of what the Member States as the 
‘Masters of the Treaties’ will accept. 
That changes in the negotiation context and process matter for the relative strengths of actors 
points to the need for integration theories to open up the ‘black box’ of actual negotiation processes, 
instead of treating all actors as functionally equivalent, and that treaty reform outcomes are solely 
determined by patterns of converging actor preferences. Further studies are now needed on the actual 
causal processes whereby actor preferences and relative power are translated into outcomes through 
negotiation processes – enabling us to explain with greater confidence which actors win in a treaty 
reform negotiation, and why. 
 
   38
Section 7 - References  
 
Beach, Derek (2001) Between Law and Politics: The relationship between the European Court of Justice and EU Member 
States. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing. 
 
Beach, Derek (2002a) ‘The negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty - when theory meets reality.’, in Finn Laursen 
(ed.) The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining, Outcome and Ratification. Odense: 
Odense University Press, pp. 593-637. 
 
Beach, Derek (2002b) Bringing negotiations back into the study of European integration : How negotiations affect the ability of 
supranational actors to gain influence in IGC’s. Ph.D. dissertation submitted in October 2002 for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy, Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark. 
 
Beach, Derek (2003) ‘The Vital Cog: Agenda-shaping and brokerage by the Council Secretariat in IGC 
negotiations.’, Paper to be presented to the EUSA 8th Biennial International Conference, Nashville, March 27-29, 
2003. 
 
Beach, Derek (forthcoming) ‘The Commission and the Council Secretariat in the negotiation of the 2000 
IGC.’, in Finn Laursen (ed.) The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice. Book manuscript 
in publication process. 
 
Bercovitch, Jacob (1996a) ‘The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations.’, in Jacob 
Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds) Mediation in International Relations. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 1-29. 
 
Bercovitch, Jacob (1996b) ‘Introduction: Thinking About Mediation.’, in Jacob Bercovitch (Ed.) Resolving 
International Conflicts - The Theory and Practice of Mediation. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1-9. 
 
Bercovitch, Jacob and Allison Houston (1996) ‘The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and 
Empirical Evidence.’, in Jacob Bercovitch (Ed.) Resolving International Conflicts - The Theory and Practice of Mediation. 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 11-35. 
 
Bond, Martyn (2002) ‘Kerrfully does it.’, The Parliament Magazine, October 2002. ??? 
 
Carnevale, Peter J. and Sharon Arad (1996) ‘Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation.’, in Jacob 
Bercovitch (Ed.) Resolving International Conflicts - The Theory and Practice of Mediation. London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, pp. 39-53. 
 
Charlemagne (1994) ‘L’equilibre entre les etats membres’, in L’equilibre européen. Etudes rassemblées et publiées en 
hommage B. Niels Ersbøll. Brussels. Edition provisoire, pp. 69-78. 
 
Christiansen, Thomas (2002) ‘The Role of Supranational Actors in EU Treaty Reform.’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, Volume 9, Number 1, February 2002, pp. 33-53. 
 
Christiansen, Thomas and Jørgensen, Knud Erik (1998) ‘Negotiating Treaty Reform in the European 
Union: The Role of the European Commission.’, International Negotiation, Volume 3, Number 3, pp.435-452. 
 
Cox, Robert W. and Harold K. Jacobsen (1973) ‘The Framework for Inquiry.’, in Robert W. Cox, Harold K. 
Jacobsen et al. The Anatomy of Influence – Decision Making in International Organizations. London: Yale University 
Press, pp. 1-36. 
 
Crum, Ben (2003) ‘Towards Finality? A preliminary assessment of the achievements of the European 
Convention.’, Draft paper prepared for Amy Verdun and Osvaldo Croci (eds) (2004) Institutional and Policy-Making 
Challenges to the European Union in the Wake of Enlargement. Manchester: Manchester University Press.   39
de Búrca, Gráinne (2001) ‘The drafting of the European Union Charter of fundamental rights.’, European Law 
Review, Volume 26, Number 2, April 2001, pp. 126-138. 
 
Dehaene, Jean-Luc (1999) The Institutional Implications of Enlargement: Report to the European Commission. Brussels, 
18 October 1999. 
 
Deloche-Gaudez, Florence (2001) ‘The Convention on a Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Method for the 
Future?’, Notre Europe Research and Policy Paper No. 15, November 2001. 
 
de Ruyt, Jean (1987) L’Acte Unique Europeen: Commentaire. Brussels: Editions de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles. 
 
Dinan, Desmond (2000) ‘The Commission and the Intergovernmental Conferences.’, in Neill Nugent (ed.) At 
the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission. 2nd Edition, London, MacMillan Press Ltd., pp. 250-269. 
 
Dinan, Desmond (2002) ‘Institutions and Governance 2001-02: Debating the EU’s Future.’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Volume 40, Annual Review, pp. 29-43. 
 
Dinan, Desmond and Sophie Vanhoonacker (2000-2001) ‘IGC 2000 Watch.’ Parts 1-4, in ECSA Review, 
Volume 13, Numbers 2-4, 2000 and Volume 14, Number 1, 2001. 
 
Donnelly, Brendan (2002) ‘The European Convention: work in progress.’, Federal Union Newsletter, December 
2002. 
 
Due, Ole (2000) ‘Regeringskonferencen og det judicielle system i EU.’, EU-ret og Menneskeret.’, Volume 7, 
Number 2, June 2000, pp. 45-51. 
 
Dupont, Christophe and Guy-Olivier Faure (1991) ‘The Negotiation Process.’, in Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.) 
International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp.40-57. 
 
Dyson, Kenneth and Kevin Featherstone (1999) The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Elgström, Ole (2001) ‘“The Honest Broker”? - The EU Council Presidency as a Mediator.’, Paper presented at 
the 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Canterbury, 8-10 September 2001. 
 
Elgström, Ole and Christer Jönsson (2000) ‘Negotiation in the European Union: bargaining or problem-
solving?’, Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 7, Number 5, Special Issue, s. 684-704. 
 
Europaudvalget (2000) ‘Europa-Kommissionen præsenterer ekspertrapport om todeling af EU-traktaterne.’, 
Info-note, bilag 152, 1999-00. 
 
European Commission (1999) Adapting the Institutions to make a success of enlargement. Contribution by the 
European Commission to preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional Issues. COM (99) 
592, 10.11.99.  
 
European Commission (2000) Commission Communication – A Basic Treaty for the European Union. Brussels, COM 
(2000) 434 final, 12.7.2000. 
 
European Policy Centre (2002) ‘Working Paper – The Commission draft Constitution: a constructive step.’, 18 
December 2002. 
 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.’, 
International Organization, Volume 52, Number 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 887-917. 
   40
Galloway, David (2001) The Treaty of Nice and Beyond – Realities and Illusions of Power in the EU. Sheffield: Sheffield 
University Press. 
 
Garrett, Geoffrey and George Tsebelis (1996) ‘An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism.’, International 
Organization, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 1996, pp. 269-299. 
 
Gray, Mark (2002) ‘Negotiating the Treaty of Amsterdam: The role and influence of the European 
Commission.’, in Finn Laursen (ed.) The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining, Outcome 
and Ratification. Odense: Odense University Press, pp. 381-404. 
 
Gray, Mark and Alexander Stubb (2001) ‘The Treaty of Nice: Negotiating a poisoned chalice?’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Volume 39, Annual Review EU 2001, September 2001, pp. 5-23.  
 
Haas, Ernst B. (1990) When knowledge is power: three models of change in international organizations. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
 
Haas, Peter (1992) ‘Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy co-ordination.’, International 
Organization, Volume 46, Number 1, pp. 1-35. 
 
Hampson, Fen Osler (1995) Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and the Environment. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Hoffmann, Lars (2002) ‘The Convention on the Future of Europe – Thoughts on the Convention-Model.’, 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 11/02, NYU School of Law.??? 
 
Hopmann, P. Terrence (1995) ‘Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem-solving.’, Annals of the 
American Academcy of Political and Social Science, Volume 542, November 1995, pp. 24-47. 
 
Hopmann, P. Terrence (1996) The negotiation process and the resolution of international conflicts. Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press. 
 
Hughes, Kirsty (2003) ‘The Battle for Power in Europe: Will the Convention Get it Right?’, EPIN Working 
Paper, No. 4, European Policy Institute Network. 
 
Jones, Bryan D. (2001) Politics and the architecture of choice: bounded rationality and governance. London: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1991) ‘Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier.’, World 
Politics, Volume 43, Number 3, April 1991, pp. 336-366. 
 
Kressel, K., Dean G. Priutt, and Associates (1989) Mediation Research: Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party 
Intervention. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Laursen, Finn (ed.) (2002) The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining, Outcome and 
Ratification. Odense: Odense University Press. 
 
Lequesne, Christian (2001) ‘The French Presidency: The Half Success of Nice.’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Volume 39, Annual Review, September 2001, pp. 47-50. 
 
Lindberg, Leon N. and Stuart A. Scheingold (1970) Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European 
Community. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Ludlow, Peter (2001) ‘The European Council at Nice: Neither Triumph nor Disaster.’, Background Paper, CEPS 
International Advisory Council, 1-2 February.   41
Manzella, Andrea (2002) ‘The Convention as a Way of Bridging the EU’s Democratic Deficit.’, The International 
Spectator, Issue 1, 2002. 
 
Maurer, Andreas (2002) ‘The European Parliament.’, in Finn Laursen (ed.) The Amsterdam Treaty: National 
Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining, Outcome and Ratification. Odense: Odense University Press, pp. 405-450. 
 
Maurer, Andreas (2003) ‘Less Bargaining – More Deliberation: The Convention Method for Enhancing EU 
Democracy.’, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, Volume 1, pp. 167-190. 
 
McAllister, Richard (1997) From EC to EU: An Historical and Political Survey. London: Routledge. 
 
McDonagh, Bobby (1998) Original Sin in a Brave New World: An Account of the Negotiation of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. Dublin: Institute of European Affairs. 
 
Metcalfe, David (1998) ‘Leadership in European Union Negotiations: The Presidency of the Council.’, 
International Negotiation, Volume 3, 1998, pp. 413-434. 
 
Midgaard, Knut and Arild Underdal (1977) ‘Multiparty Conferences.’, in Daniel Druckman (Ed.) Negotiations : 
Social-psychological perspectives. London: Sage Publications, pp. 329-346. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1999) ‘A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation.’, 
International Organization, Volume 53, Number 2, Spring 1999, pp.267-306. 
 
Petite, Michel (2000) ‘ The IGC and the European Commission.’, in Edward Best, Mark Gray and Alexander 
Stubb (eds) Rethinking the European Union: IGC 2000 and Beyond. Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration, pp. 61-66. 
 
Piris, Jean-Claude (1999) ‘Does the European Union have a Constitution? Does it need one?’, European Law 
Review, Volume 24, Number ???, December 1999, pp. 557-585. 
 
Raiffa, Howard (1982) The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Ross, George (1995) Jacques Delors and European Integration. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Sandholtz, Wayne (1992) High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 
Scharpf, Fritz (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Oxford: Westview 
Press. 
 
Schout, Adriaan and Sophie Vanhoonacker (forthcoming) ‘Nice and the French Presidency.’, in Finn 
Laursen (ed.) The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice. Book manuscript in publication 
process. 
 
Sebenius, James K. (1992) ‘Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation: negotiation 
analysis and the case of epistemic communities.’, International Organization, Volume 46, Number 1, Winter 1992, 
pp. 323-365. 
 
Sebenius, James K. (2002) ‘International Negotiation Analysis.’, i Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.) International 
Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 229-255. 
 
Simon, Herbert A. (1997) Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations. 
Fourth Edition. New York: The Free Press. 
   42
Stubb, Alexander (1998) Flexible Integration and the Amsterdam Treaty: Negotiating Differentiation in the 1996-97 IGC. 
Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Michaelmas Term, December 1998. 
 
Stubb, Alexander (2002) Negotiating Flexibility in the European Union. Palgrave: Houndmills, Basingstoke. 
 
Tallberg, Jonas (2001) ‘Responsabilité sans Pouvoir? The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the EU Council 
Presidency.’, Paper presented at the 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Canterbury, 8-10 
September 2001. 
 
Tallberg, Jonas (2002) ‘The Power of the Chair in International Bargaining.’, Paper presented at the 2002 ISA 
Annual Convention, New Orleans, March 24-27 2002. 
 
Vanhoonacker, Sophie (1992) ‘The European Parliament.’, in Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds) 
The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, pp. 215-
228. 
 
Wall, James A. and Ann Lynn (1993) ‘Mediation: a current review.’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 37, 
Number 1, March 1993, pp. 160-194. 
 
Wall, James A., John B. Stark and Rhetta L. Standifer (2001) ‘Mediation: a current review and theory 
development.’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 45, Number 3, June 2001, pp. 370-391. 
 
Wehr, Paul and John Paul Lederach (1996) ‘Mediating Conflict in Central America.’, in Jacob Bercovitch 
(Ed.) Resolving International Conflicts - The Theory and Practice of Mediation. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 55-
74. 
 
Westlake, Martin (1999) The Council of the European Union. Revised Edition. London: John Harper Publishing. 
 
Young, Oran R. (1967) The Intermediaries. Third Parties in International Crises. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Young, Oran R. (1991) ‘Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in 
international society.’, International Organization, Volume 45, Number 3, Summer 1991, pp.281-308. 
 
Young, Oran R. (1999) ‘Comment on Andrew Moravcsik, “A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and 
international cooperation.”’, International Organization, Volume 53, Number 4, Autumn 1999, pp.805-809. 
 
Zartmann, William I. (1991) ‘The Structure of Negotiation.’, in Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.) International 
Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 65-77. 